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Abstract
The effect of mild depression on time estimation and production was investigated. Participants made both magnitude
estimation and magnitude production judgments for five time intervals (specified in seconds) from 3 sec to 65 sec. The
parameters of the best fitting psychophysical function (power law exponent, intercept, and threshold) were determined
individually for each participant in every condition. There were no significant effects of mood (high BDI, low BDI) or
judgment (estimation, production) on the mean exponent, n= .98, 95% confidence interval (.96–1.04) or on the threshold.
However, the intercept showed a ‘depressive realism’ effect, where high BDI participants had a smaller deviation from
accuracy and a smaller difference between estimation and judgment than low BDI participants. Accuracy bias was assessed
using three measures of accuracy: difference, defined as psychological time minus physical time, ratio, defined as
psychological time divided by physical time, and a new logarithmic accuracy measure defined as ln (ratio). The ln (ratio)
measure was shown to have approximately normal residuals when subjected to a mixed ANOVA with mood as a between
groups explanatory factor and judgment and time category as repeated measures explanatory factors. The residuals of the
other two accuracy measures flagrantly violated normality. The mixed ANOVAs of accuracy also showed a strong depressive
realism effect, just like the intercepts of the psychophysical functions. There was also a strong negative correlation between
estimation and production judgments. Taken together these findings support a clock model of time estimation, combined
with additional cognitive mechanisms to account for the depressive realism effect. The findings also suggest strong
methodological recommendations.
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Introduction
Subjective time passes slowly for people who are in a depressed
state [1,2,3,4,5], and they may use phrases such as ‘time seems to
drag’ to describe their experiences However, people with
depression are also reported to have more realistic perceptions
in some cognitive tasks, labelled ‘depressive realism’ [3,6,7,8].
Given this paradoxical combination of slowness and realism, it is
not surprising then that evidence for mood effects on time
perception has been inconsistent and contradictory. See [3] for a
review.
Historically, there have been two main approaches to the
psychology of direct time perception. The psychophysical judg-
ment approach has used magnitude estimation and magnitude
production tasks and has used estimated parameters of the
psychophysical function relating psychological duration to clock
time in order to explore timing accuracy. What will be termed
here the bias approach looks at deviations of estimates from clock
time, i.e. accuracy, as a function of participant groups and
experimental conditions. As will be discussed shortly, deviation
measures of accuracy bring particular analytic problems that have
not been fully explicated in relation to between group effects, such
as depression.
This study investigates the effect of mood state and judgment
method on direct time judgments, involving durations from 2 s to
65 s, with 5 time categories, termed ‘timecats’ in each experimen-
tal condition Two methods of direct judgment are used: estimation
and production, with the term ‘judgment’ used here to refer to
either method. The term estimation is used when an interval, often
bounded by auditory signals, is presented to participants, who then
give a verbal estimate of the duration of that interval; or production, is
used when participants produce an experimenter specified duration.
These judgments can be either absolute or relative. For absolute
judgments, participants’ estimations are in seconds and their
production is of a duration specified by experimenter in seconds.
Relative judgments are always made relative to some standard
interval, with no reference to clock time. In the simplest form of
estimation, participants are presented with a fixed standard at the
beginning of a session and told its value is ‘100’, for example. They
then give a number for each of a series of presented intervals such
that twice as long as the standard is ‘200’ and half as long is ‘50’,
etc. Production starts with the same fixed standard interval and
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participants have to produce intervals that correspond to numbers
such as ‘200’, ‘50’, etc. A more complex, but potentially less biased
approach uses multiple different standards [9].
The study as reported here had two main aims. The first was to
establish whether a depressive realism effects is present for time
estimation so one focus is on the effect of mood on time estimation.
The second aim was to evaluate the relation between estimation
and production judgments. Thus the second focus is on assessing
classes of model, as one posited implication of internal clock or
pacemaker models is that there will be a negative correlation
between estimation and production. A final third aim was to
compare results from the absolute judgment with results from the
more complex form of relative judgment described above. In the
end this final aim was not realized because nearly half the
participants appeared unable to successfully perform the version of
the relative task used here. The difficulties with the relative task in
no way invalidate the highly reliable results from the absolute task.
As a discussion of relative task performance and the relative merits
of each method are beyond the scope of this paper and we do not
discuss further (see [9] for discussion of the differences between
absolute & relative judgment).
The Psychophysical Function Approach
Psychophysical functions relate psychological sensation, Y, to
physical intensity, P, where Y is expressed numerically on a ratio
scale. That is, participants are instructed to assign numbers in such
a way that if a physical stimulus, of magnitude P1, is perceived as
twice as intense as a stimulus, P2, then the number Y1, assigned to
P1 should be twice as large as the number, Y2, assigned to P2.
Since the seminal work of Stevens [10,11], it is well known that the
psychophysical function approximates a power law. This has been
demonstrated for many prothetic continua by regressing log (Y) on
log (P) and taking the slope of the regression function as THE
power law exponent for the relevant modality (equation 1). We
considered 4 possible forms for the psychophysical function, as
shown in equations 1 to 4.
t~atn ð1Þ
ln (t)~n ln (t)z ln (a) ð2Þ
t~a(t{b)n ð3Þ
ln (t)~n ln (t{b)z ln (a) ð4Þ
where t is a psychological judgment of time and t is physical time
in seconds.
Marks and Stevens, showed as early as 1968, that equation 4
provided a better fit for several modalities (with the threshold
parameter chosen ‘by eye’) [12,13]. Similarly, Allan (1983) found
that equation 2 provided a better fit for her participants for time
estimation; and West, Ward and Khosia [14] found that the log
form of equation 2 (equation 4) fit best for loudness. Nevertheless
the most prevalent equation for the psychophysical function is
equation 1. It is also well known that features other than the
physical magnitude of the stimuli affect the power law exponent.
For example, West, Ward and Khosia [14], using equation 4,
showed that instructions can change the exponent for loudness;
and Marks [15] showed that the frequency of pure tones changed
the loudness exponent. There are relatively few such studies for the
time modality, and all use equation 1. Glicksohn and his
colleagues have investigated the effects of personality traits and
attention load on intercepts and slopes for reproduction based
psychophysical functions. One study [16] shows a decreased slope
for high sensation seekers and another [17] shows no effect on
slope, but an increase in intercept for low sensation seekers relative
to base line for both low and high overload and for high sensation
seekers for high attention load only. Hemmes et al. found lower
exponents and higher intercepts when participants engage in an
attention demanding secondary task. This literature review shows
that psychophysical parameters vary systematically according to
condition and participant category. Consequently, studying the
effect of manipulating such variables provides a powerful window
on the processes underlying time perception.
In order to use the ‘best’ psychophysical function in this study,
we evaluated goodness of fit for equations 1–4 as follows. Adjusted
r2 values were obtained separately for all functions for every
participant. These adjusted r2 values were then converted to Z
values to correct for ceiling effects, as r was close to 1 for most
functions. Then an ANOVA was conducted with Z as response,
mood (depressed, low BDI) as a between factor predictor, and
judgment (estimation, production), number of parameters (2, 3)
and format (log, power) as repeated measures predictors. The 3
parameter models that include the threshold parameter, b, fit
better than the 2 parameter models with a substantial effect size,
partial eta squared, g2 = .57 (g2 = .14 is a ‘large’ effect size by
convention). The power models fit better than the log models
overall, However, post hoc analyses, following up the interaction,
shows that this superiority of power models is only present for the
2 parameter models, F (1,38) = 27.8, p,.0005, g2 = .42; and not
significant for the 3 parameter models F (1,38) = 1.0, p = .333. In
summary, the best fitting model is the 3-parameter power model,
although it was not reliably superior to the 3-parameter log model.
A similar re-analysis of previously reported roughness functions
[18] gave equation 2 as significantly superior to equation 4. Note
that although equation 1 and 3 are equivalent, as are equations 2
and 4, the goodness of fit is not identical, as the loss functions
being optimized are different. Consequently, equation 3 is used to
estimate parameters for this study.
Using equation 3, complete accuracy is equivalent to a=1,
n=1, b=0, when t is in seconds and participants are instructed to
provide responses in seconds. So the most accurate groups or
participants will produce the intercept parameter a and the power
law exponent n closest to 1 and the threshold parameter b closest
to 0. The effect of mood and judgment on all three parameters of
the psychophysical function is investigated here.
The Bias Approach
The second approach looks at bias, i.e. the average magnitude
of over or under estimation, as the main dependent variable. Most
investigations of non-time variables, such as mood, psychopathol-
ogy, concurrent task, or drugs, use this approach
[16,19,20,21,22,23]. A variety of methods have been used to get
psychological time estimates: including bisection, generalization
from a target reinforced duration, categorisation, and the ratio of
psychological to time, as well as magnitude estimation and
production, see [24] for review. Much of this work is within the
framework of the popular scalar expectancy model. This model
postulates the following components: an interval clock or
pacemaker that is started and stopped by switches when some
duration is to be judged (i.e. estimated or produced}; and a gated
accumulator [25] that collects ticks in working memory with
durations stored in long term reference memory. For estimation, if
the clock is running ‘faster’ than real time, then ticks accumulate
Time Perception and Depressive Realism
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so quickly that participants will overestimate clock time and time
will be judged as passing slower. Such overestimation will also
occur if the gate to the accumulator is wide open, because all the
participants’ attention is focused on the time estimation task [25].
Conversely, in the production task, the participant will keep on
timing the interval and accumulating ticks until they have the
correct number of ticks copied into working memory, if the clock is
running fast or the gate is open wide accumulation will be fast and
the target reached quickly, resulting in an underestimation for
production. Thus scalar expectancy theory (SET) implies a
negative correlation between production and estimation judg-
ments, unless judgments are veridical. Timing may also be
influenced by the time taken to turn the switch to the gate on and
off, and whether the switch remains open for the whole duration
or flickers on and off, both of which may be influenced by different
variables than those that influence the clock rate or the gate. See a
number of useful sources [26,27,28,29,30,31,32] for descriptions
and critiques of the SET model and its variants.
SET is often evaluated by a linear regression of subjective time
on clock time. It is then assumed that changes in slope imply
changes in internal clock speed or equivalently rate of accumu-
lation of ticks [25,31,33,34,35,36,37]. (Obviously, these 2 mech-
anisms cannot be distinguished empirically). Recently, Mathews
has challenged this assumption in an ingenious experiment in
which intervals are demarcated by squares of different sizes. If the
start and end makers are the same size the slope is different than
from when they are different. He argues, convincingly, that since
the effect depends on the end marker size (which participants do
not know in advance), it cannot be influencing what is happening
while the clock is ticking and feeding the accumulator. At a more
global modelling level it is argued that time estimation must
involve at least two processes since features that influence the slope
and intercept of the linear function can be dissociated, e.g.
participant anxiety, fear of threat or stimulus intensity or
contrast.[1,2,4,5,38,39].
Our interest is in mood, i.e. in whether there is a depressive
realism effect on time estimation, where people who are mildly
depressed are more accurate in time estimation than those who
show little evidence of depression through their scores on
depression questionnaires such as the Beck Depression Inventory,
BDI, [40] (here referred to as low BDI individuals), an effect, so
salient in cognitive judgment tasks. Typically the measure used to
test for timing accuracy has either been raw deviation t–t; or the
ratio t/t, as Weber’s law and empirical evidence suggests that t/t
(unlike t–t) does not increase with clock time. (Of course, t/t only
differs from relative difference = (t–t)/t = t/t –1 by a constant,
therefore we have chosen to display results for the ratio for
simplicity). The measure t/t has the disadvantage that it is not
symmetric about the perfect accuracy value t/t = 1. Symmetry
about perfect accuracy is desirable because symmetry treats over
and under estimation equivalently. The raw ratio overemphasises
over estimation. This is because a subjective estimate twice the
true value has t/t = 1, with difference from perfect accuracy= 2.0–
1.0 = 1.0; but a subjective estimate half the true value will have t/
t = .5, with difference from perfect accuracy = .5–1.0 =2.5.
Consequently averaging differences from 1 will have a bias
towards overestimation. For this reason we believe that ln(t/t) is
theoretically a preferable measure of accuracy, as it is symmetric
about the perfect accuracy value ln(t/t) = 0. As far as we know, the
raw t–t and ratio t/t or t/t–1 measures have not been examined
systematically in studies where the main focus was the effect on
accuracy of other variables, and ln (t/t) has not been tried at all.
This study remedies that problem. The effect of the explanatory
variables, mood, judgment and time category are investigated
using mixed model ANOVA on all three deviation from accuracy
measures: raw = t–t, ratio = t/t, and ln = ln(t /t). This enables
not only evaluation of the effect of the explanatory variables, but
also evaluation of the mean deviation from perfect accuracy in
each combination of conditions. As with the psychophysical
functions, the number of individuals showing each pattern of
accuracy is also evaluated.
In summary, the major predictor variables are mood, judgment,
and time category (timecat). Obviously we expect time judgments
to increase with clock time. The psychophysical function question
is the form of that increase, as expressed in the parameters, n, a, b
of equation 3. Our hypothesis is that n will not depend on mood or
judgment, but that a will show a depressive realism effect and be
closer to zero for participants who show more evidence of mild
depression, here termed the high BDI group; we have no
hypotheses about b. For the bias approach we predict a depressive
realism effect such that mean deviation from accuracy will be
smaller for the low BDI group. This hypothesis will be tested
separately for the three deviation measures: t–t, t/t and ln(t/t).
Methods
Ethics Statement
Ethics approval was granted by the Psychology Ethics
Committee under delegated authority from the Ethics Committee
of the University of Hertfordshire, to Rachel Msetfi, Protocol
Number: PSY/01/07/RM, extended to include Diana Kornbrot
and Melvyn Grimwood, Jan 2011.
Participants
There were 46 students, who participated in this study as a
course requirement. Participants were categorized post hoc on the
basis of their Beck Depression Inventory scores [BDI: 40] as the:
low BDI group, BDI ,7, or high BDI group with BDI $7). The
criterion of BDI $7 corresponds to a median split for these
recruited participants. This is a lower value than the criterion of
BDI $9 from the standardisation of the test, [40]; but actually
slightly higher than the criterion BDI $5 which has been used
successfully in some of our previous studies with median split
[7,41]. Thus the high BDI group corresponds to mild depression,
sometimes known as dysphoria, often seen in students who are
functioning successfully at University. Screening, as described in
the results section, reduced the number of participants with data
contributing to the final analysis to 39. These comprised 21 low
BDI, age (mean 19.9, range 18–28 yrs), BDI (mean 3.4, range 0–
6); and 18 high BDI, age (mean 19.9, range 18–26 yrs), BDI (mean
12.5, range 7–26).
Tasks and Design
All participants completed four counterbalanced conditions
comprising two tasks (absolute, A, or relative, R) crossed with two
judgment types (estimation, E, or production, P). For absolute
estimation, participants judged the duration of presented intervals
in seconds, with the following instructions.
‘‘In this task you will be asked to listen to 5 tones of varying
lengths. Before you listen to the tones you will be asked to
remember a number. When the tone finishes you will be
asked to estimate the length of the tone in seconds and
remember the number.
Please ask if you have any questions. If you are comfortable
to proceed to the experiment press any key.’’
Time Perception and Depressive Realism
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For absolute production, they generated intervals specified by
the experimenter in seconds with the following instructions.
‘‘In this task you will be asked to generate 5 tones of varying
lengths by pressing the space bar to start and finish the tone.
Before generating each tone you will be asked to remember
a number.
Please ask if you have any questions. If you are comfortable
to proceed to the experiment press the space bar.’’
All participants judged five durations (timecat) per condition,
varying from 2 s to 65 s on a logarithmic scale. Durations are
shown in Table 1. All participants received the same stimulus set
for production. For estimation, each participant was randomly
allocated to one of 4 estimation stimulus sets, produced by jittering
from the production set. This was to prevent carry over between
conditions and anchor numbers. Within each condition the order
of presentation was completely randomised and was different for
each participant. Results are reported here only for the absolute
task, as the relative task was too difficult for several participants.
Thus the final design has mood (low BDI, high BDI) as a between
group predictor and judgment (estimation, production) and time
category (1 to 5) as repeated measures predictors. In all conditions,
participants were given a 3-digit number at the start of each trial to
be recalled at the end of the trial to prevent counting as a timing
strategy. Participants were randomly allocated to one of four
counterbalanced orders. Tasks were programmed in Superlab 4.5
on a PC under Windows XP.
The planned recruitment was 20 low BDI and 20 high BDI
participants, with the intention of using all parameters separately
as dependent variables. A negative correlation (2.2) between
estimation and production was assumed (an estimate based on the
known small negative correlation between estimation and
production). The final design thus has one between subjects
factor, mood, and one within subjects factor judgment. Power was
68% to detect a medium mood effect, f = .25 and 97% to detect a
large effect, f = .40.4. Power for the judgment main effect and the
mood by judgment interaction was 51% to detect a medium,
f = .25, or 89% to detect a large effect, f = .4. Power was calculated
using G* [42,43,44].
Procedure
Participants were seated in front of a PC in a quiet cubicle.
They then read the general information sheet, signed the consent
form, and received a verbal introduction. Each condition started
with a screen presenting instructions. Participants initiated the first
trial by pressing any key. In the estimation condition the interval to
be estimated started and ended with a brief 200 Hz tone. In the
production condition the interval started with a brief 200 Hz tone
and was terminated by the participant pressing the space bar.
There was a short break between conditions. After the fourth
condition, participants completed the computerized version of the
BDI. Participants were then debriefed and given a sheet including
information on services for people feeling depressed.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Inferential tests were carried out at the 95% confidence level,
lower and upper 95% confidence levels follow parameter estimates
in parentheses. The 46 original participants comprised 24 low BDI
and 22 high BDI participants. Psychophysical functions were
obtained for each participant for each judgment combination
using equation 1 [a linear regression of ln (t) on ln (t), as is
standard practice]. A performance criterion of R2adj $.90 was
used to assess success. Data from 4 out of 24 participants in the
depressed group, and 3 out of 24 in the low BDI group, produced
R2adj ,0.90 for at least one condition, or showed disregard of the
memory instructions. Data for these participants were excluded
from all further analyses and are not discussed further. After this
screening process 21 low BDI and 18 high BDI participants
remained.
Psychophysical Function Parameters
Psychophysical parameters a, n, b, as defined in equation 3
were estimated for every participant, separately for the estimation
and production conditions. This generated 78 psychophysical
functions (2 times 21 for low BDI and 2 times 18 for high BDI
participants). ANOVAs, with mood (between) and judgment
(repeated) as explanatory variables, were then conducted sepa-
rately for the exponents, n, the offset parameters a, and the
threshold parameters, b, as defined in equation 3.
Exponent value, n. For the power exponent n there were no
significant effects of mood, F(1,37) = 2.17, p= .149; or judgment,
F(1,37) = .90, p = .348; or their interaction, F(1,37) = 1.86,
p = .180, where the mean n= .99 (.93, 1.04), SD = .24, range
from .44 to 1.87. Thus the 95% confidence interval for mean n
spans 1, and so is not statistically different from 1.
There were 39 individual estimation functions and 39 individual
production functions. If there is no tendency for n to be different
from 1, then from 39 functions the predicted frequency of n
numerically ,1= predicted frequency of n numerically .1= 19
or 20. Furthermore, the predicted frequency of n significantly ,1=
predicted frequency of n significantly .1,=1. The observed
frequency of n numerically ,1= 19/39 for estimation (ns); and
29/39 for production, exact p = .001. The observed frequency of n
significantly ,1= 4/39 for both production and estimation, exact
p = .001. There was one function for estimation with n signifi-
cantly .1 as might occur by chance. Hence, although the mean n
is not significantly ,1, at the individual level a significant
proportion of functions for production do have n numerically less
than 1. Furthermore, the proportion of functions with n,
significantly less than 1 is greater than predicted by chance for
both estimation and production.
Intercept Parameter, a. By contrast, for the intercept
parameter a, there was a significant and statistically large mood
by judgment interaction, F(1,37) = 7.97, p = .008, g2 = .17, with
no reliable main effects. Summary statistics are shown in Table 2.
It is noteworthy that for the low BDI group the 95% confidence
level of a for estimation is above the complete accuracy value of 1,
while for production it is below 1. Conversely, for the high BDI
group the 95% confidence interval spanned 1 for both estimation
and productions. This is a depressive realism effect for the
Table 1. Stimulus durations in seconds.
Timecat Production Estimation
1 2 3 4
1 5 2 3 4 5
2 10 11 10 12 13
3 18 24 20 16 22
4 34 36 28 39 30
5 65 52 64 55 58
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0071585.t001
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psychophysical function parameter a. The interaction is such that
for low BDI participants mean a (estimation) . mean a
(production), F(1, 20) = 4.35, p = .050, g2 = .17; while for
depressed participants mean a (estimation) , mean a (produc-
tion), F(1, 17) = 4.35, p= .054, g2 = .20.
Table 3 shows the frequency of individual functions, by mood
and judgment that are: significantly below 1, below 1, above 1 and
significantly above 1. As may be seen, there is no significant
asymmetry in any of the four groups. However, what is striking is
that the proportion of functions with the a value significantly
different from 1 is 8/39, exact p= .0003 for estimation and 5/39,
exact p= .012, for production.
Threshold Parameter, b. There were no significant effects
on the parameter b: for mood F(1,37) = 1.46, p = .234; or for
judgment F(1,37) = .28, p = .601; for the mood by judgment
interaction, F(1,37) = .50, p = .486. Mean b=2.65 (21.58, .29) is
not significantly different from zero, overall or for any sub-group.
The range of b values was large, 227.1 to 5.0, with a high SD
=4.5. There are more functions with b,0 than with b.0, for
estimation, 27/39 exact p = .012, but no asymmetry for produc-
tion 19/39 with b,0.
Accuracy Bias
Figure 1 shows mean accuracy as a function of mood, judgment
and time category for three different accuracy measures: difference
(t–t)in top panel, ratio t/t in middle panel and ln(ratio) ln(t/t) in
bottom panel. Figure 1 suggests both a mood by judgment
interaction and some mean deviations from perfect accuracy. So,
separate MIXED model ANOVAs were conducted for each of the
accuracy measures, with mood as a between groups explanatory
variable and judgment and time category as repeated measures
explanatory variables (equivalent to repeated measures MAN-
OVA). Normality tests on the residuals showed strong deviation
from normality for the difference measure, Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) = .19, p,.0005 and maximum de-trended residual, 2.5
sigma; for the ratio measure, KS = .10, p,.0005, maximum de-
trended residual, 7.0 sigma. However, for the ln(ratio), KS = .043,
p = .082, maximum de-trended residual, 1 sigma. Figure 2 shows
box and quantile plots for the residuals for the three accuracy
measures, with difference and ratio clearly non-normal ‘by eye’.
Normality of residuals is a highly desirable property, since the
assumption that the calculated F statistics do indeed have the F
distribution depends on this property, without it the null p-values
may be simply wrong. These results for the residuals imply that
ln(ratio) is the preferred measure of accuracy, a new finding.
However, results for difference and ratio measures of accuracy are
also reported to compare with earlier work.
Mood and judgment effects on accuracy. The ANOVAs
provide confidence intervals about means for each accuracy
measure, but of course these measures are not directly comparable
numerically. Consequently, all measures have been converted into
a common metric of percentage over and underestimate, as shown
in Table 4, which also shows t- statistics and null p values for the
hypothesis that the accuracy measure is statistically significantly
different from complete accuracy (0 for difference and ln(ratio), 1
for ratio). There is a striking depressive realism effect in these data.
Low BDI participants overestimate by more than 10% on all
estimation condition measures, although the departure from
accuracy is only significant at the 90% level for ln(ratio) measure,
p = .081. They also underestimate significantly by at least 13% on
all production condition measures. By contrast, for the high BDI
participants no departure from accuracy is greater than 8%, and
none is statistically significant, even at the 80% confidence level.
Table 2. Summary statistics for offset parameter a as a
function of mood and judgment.
Mood Judgment Mean SD LCL UCL Min Max
Normal Estimation 2.07 2.09 1.36 2.78 .37 7.12
Production 1.12 .59 .72 1.52 .09 2.27
Depressed Estimation .96 .72 .20 1.73 .05 2.51
Production 1.65 1.17 1.22 2.08 .01 4.57
Note. LCL is lower 95% confidence level; UCL is upper 95% confidence level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0071585.t002
Table 3. Frequency of significance tests for parameter a as a
function of mood and judgment.
Mood Judge a,1, p,.05 a,1, ns a.1, ns a.1, p,.05
Low BDI Estimation 1 8 10 2
Production 2 5 12 2
High BDI Estimation 4 6 7 1
Production 1 5 12 0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0071585.t003
Figure 1. Accuracy measures as a function of time category.
Legend: Upper panel, difference measure; middle panel ratio measure,
lower panel, ln (ratio) measure. Solid lines, low BDI participants; dashed
lines, depressed participants. Filled squares, estimation judgments;
open diamonds, production judgments.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0071585.g001
Time Perception and Depressive Realism
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The ANOVAs showed no main effects for mood (all F(1, 37)
,1) or judgment (all F(1,37) ,1.8). However, the depressive
realism effect shows up for all three measures as significant mood
by judgment interactions: for the difference measure, F(1,37) = 5.12,
p = .029, g2 = .12; for the ratio measure F(1,37) = 6.14, p = .0018,
g2 = .14; for the ln(ratio) measure, F(1,37) = 5.85, p = .021,
g2 = .14.
At the individual level there was no significant asymmetry in the
proportion of participants over or under estimating for estimation
or production for the low BDI group, or for estimation in the high
BDI group for any measure. By contrast, all measures had 17/21
participants underestimating for production, exact p= .0007.
Ln(ratio) and ratio were almost identical in terms of significant
departures form accuracy, while difference showed many fewer
significant departures. The results are reported for ln(ratio), since
this is our preferred measure. For the low BDI group estimation
gave 7/21 significant overestimates for, p =,.00005 and 2/21
underestimates, p = .0148; and for production it gave 8/21
significant underestimates, p,.00005 and 2/21 overestimates.
For the high BDI group, estimation gave 4/18 underestimates,
p = .0001 and 2/18 overestimates; while production gave 3/18
overestimates and 3/18 underestimates p = .0096. Thus the low
BDI group shows more significant effects in the predicted direction
14/19, p,.0005; while the high BDI group also shows more
significant departures than expected by chance, but with no
discernible relation to estimation method.
Figure 2. Normality of residuals for three accuracy measures. Legend: Left panels, normal quantile plots; right panels box plots. Top panel,
difference measure; middle panel, ratio measure, bottom panel ln (ratio) measure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0071585.g002
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Correlations between Estimation and Production
Parameters
The correlation between estimation accuracy and production
accuracy was calculated for all three accuracy measures, separately
for each mood group. All accuracy measures show a strong
negative correlation between estimation and production, with all p
values ,.05 for the high BDI and all p values ,.0005 for the low
BDI. For the high BDI: r (difference) =2.57, r (ratio) =2.51, r
(ln(ratio)) =2.55 . For the low BDI: r (difference) =2.78, r (ratio)
=2.72, r (ln(ratio)) =2.77. With this number of participants, the
difference between correlations between the groups is not
significant. However, power is low: 48% and 93% to detect a
medium large effect sizes respectively for the difference between
correlations.
At the individual level, it is noteworthy that no participant
significantly overestimates for both estimation and production, or
significantly underestimates for both production and estimation.
Significant deviations from accuracy in the same direction for
production and estimation would violate assumptions of internal
clock timing models.
Discussion
Psychophysical functions and bias measures were used to assess
timing accuracy and between groups differences related to
depressed mood. As will be discussed below, data from both types
of measure consistently indicated the presence of bias, such that
people for whom there was evidence of mild depression (high BDI
participants) made time judgments that were generally closer to
accuracy than those made by people with low BDI. Below we
discuss the results from each measure below, make several
methodological recommendations for future work, and then
discuss theoretical implications for timing models and depressive
realism.
Time perception measures
Psychophysical Functions. The key psychophysical param-
eter n that indexes whether psychological time grows faster, slower
or at the same rate as clock time is discussed first. There is no
suggestion of any significant effect of either mood or judgment on
the power law exponent, n. The mean value has n= .98 (.93, 1.04)
not statistically different from 1. However, using the prevalent two
parameter log model gives n= .98 (.97, 1.00). Furthermore, the
percentage of functions with n significantly ,1 was 10%, where
only 2.5% is predicted by chance. These results are not
inconsistent with recent findings of exponents slightly less than
unity 45]. The mean exponent is higher than those found by
earlier workers, (e.g. [11,46]). Moreover, Allan’s long condition,
with times from .4 to 8.1s (most similar to this study) had mean
n= .91 (.78, 1.04) for the three parameter power formulation. She
also found lower values using the prevalent two parameter log
formulation, n= .84 (.78, .89) [12]. The reason for this difference
is unknown.
However, the offset intercept parameter, a, does show a
depressive realism effect. This finding is consistent with models
that suggest that n reflects underlying sensory mechanisms, while
a reflects cognitive factors such as attention that may differ
between groups or experimental manipulations. Frustratingly,
there is little earlier work that we can consider this finding
alongside, as intercepts are often not reported. It is surprising,
here, that the threshold parameter, b, is not statistically different
from zero, since its inclusion substantially improves fit, as
described in the introduction. This may be because individual
values of b can be either positive or negative.
In summary, it appears that both mood and judgment method
have at most a small effect on the way subjective time grows with
physical time (study was powered to detect a medium effect), the
exponent, n. By contrast, the mood by judgment interaction on
the offset parameter, a, is statistically large (g2 = .14 is ‘large’ by
convention).
Bias parameters. All three measures of bias show a
depressive realism effect such that the high BDI group was more
accurate than the low BDI group.
Individual Results. The current study was not designed to
have sufficient power to detect differences in patterns of individual
results. The findings are nevertheless interesting and suggest that
differences in mean values may occur because more participants
have values in one direction than another rather than because all
participants have small effects in the same direction. Thus mean
over estimates in estimation and under estimates in production for
the low BDI group may occur because more of these participants
have significant results following this pattern. The low BDI group
had 9/21 significant departures from accuracy for estimation
functions, seven of them over estimates; and 10/21 significant
departures from accuracy for production, eight of them under
estimates. The high BDI group also had more significant
departures from accuracy (6/18) than is expected by chance but
evenly split, three over, three under for estimation, and four under
and two 2 over for production. Exploring patterns of accuracy
amongst individual participants was shown to be useful in this
study and deserves more attention.
Methodological Recommendations
Two main methodological recommendations follow from this
work. Firstly, the best fitting psychophysical model should be used
to estimate psychophysical parameters. As Allan (1983) pointed
out, there is absolutely no excuse for lazily assuming two
parameter logarithmic modes, although these may also need to
be fitted to compare with earlier results. Good estimates of
functional form require judgments of a minimum of 5 different
physical values. Its our view, that one gets power per pound (bang
per buck) by increasing the number of time intervals to be
Table 4. Mean percentage over or under estimation for all
three measures of accuracy.
Measure Mood Judgment Mean LCL UCL t p
Difference Low BDI Estimation 13.3 1.2 25.3 2.23 .038
Production 214.3 227.9 2.7 2.13 .046
High BDI Estimation 24.0 217.0 9.0 .62 .540
Production 6.8 27.9 21.5 .94 .361
Ratio Low BDI Estimation 16.0 3.4 28.7 2.58 .018
Production 213.0 225.2 2.9 2.17 .042
High BDI Estimation 23.1 216.7 10.5 .46 .649
Production 7.9 25.3 21.0 1.22 .238
ln(Ratio) Low BDI Estimation 10.8 21.0 24.1 1.84 .081
Production 215.5 223.9 26.2 3.27 .004
High BDI Estimation 25.7 216.6 6.5 .98 .339
Production 3.0 28.0 15.3 .52 .607
Note. Includes: mean, lower 95% confidence level (LCL), upper 95% confidence
level (UCL), t-statistic for departure from accuracy, t, and probability, p, that
departure from accuracy is significant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0071585.t004
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estimated than by having several replications of each estimate (but
we have not yet tested this mathematically).
Secondly, estimates of accuracy, for time estimation at least,
should use the ln (ratio) measure of accuracy. This is a completely
new finding, which should be useful for any modality that uses
accuracy as a dependent variable. In this particular study, using
measures of accuracy that flagrantly violated assumptions of
normally distributed residuals did not change the final conclusion,
that a substantial depressive realism effect on time perception
exists. However, this is certainly possible and it did change the
magnitude of the effect in percentage terms, and magnitudes of
effects matter [47]. It is also important to note that if individual
psychophysical functions are non-linear, then using mean response
across participants, as in an ANOVA of raw data, may lead to
biases. As is well known for non-linear models the mean of the
individual means is not the same as the mean of the means to each
stimulus.
There has been much recent discussion of the shortcomings of
psychological research, with social pressures for replication at the
forefront of this debate [48,49,50,51]. Meanwhile the effect of
using inappropriate statistical tests may have been underestimated,
as shown here by the direct comparison of competing measures of
accuracy.
Theoretical Implications
Time Perception Frameworks. The negative correlations,
between estimation and production parameters, are consistent
with a timing mechanism involving the accumulation of ticks on
an internal clock. Moreover, these correlations are salient for high
BDI as well as low BDI participants in spite of the minimal effects
on accuracy. A lack of correlation would have been a challenge to
scalar timing. However, there are other explanations for such
correlations that have either multiple clocks or no clocks at all, see
[24] for a review.
Some workers using the scalar timing framework postulate that
variables that interact with physical time must have an effect on
the internal clock itself, e.g. [22,24,35,52], or the gating of ticks
into the accumulator, e.g. [25,33,37]. A slightly different
approach, the one used here, is to identify parameters of timing
models, and then investigate what variables affect each parameter
e.g. [16,17,20,35,45,53,54]. In this study, both mood and
judgment affect overall bias, and the intercept but not the slope
parameter of the psychophysical function. However, in our view
this has no implications either for or against the existence of an
internal clock mediating time perception.
Depressive Realism. Depressive realism has been demon-
strated here to occur in time perception, in addition to the well-
documented effects in other domains [3,55]. The magnitude of the
effect is substantial, with 16% overestimates in estimation and
11% underestimation in production for people with no evidence of
depression. However, for those for whom depression scores were
somewhat elevated (to a similar level to other studies investigating
depressive realism see [55] for a review), effects were less that 6%
and not significant. The offset parameter, a, from the psycho-
physical functions are consistent with these accuracy biases.
So why are these participants, who score above average on a
depression scale more accurate in their timing? The first point to
note is that these mildly depressed people who are apparently fully
functioning in a University environment are not similar to
clinically depressed group, where performance has not so far
been shown to be more accurate than for non-depressed groups
(however defined), see [3]. Thus, considering the large body of
work which has been carried out on depression and time
perception, and time perception in the general population, as
well as the current results, we might postulate the existence of a
curvilinear relation between mood and time accuracy; whereby
states of mild dysphoria are associated with most veridical time
perception, and while optimal on one level this may not be most
desirable for wellbeing.
The number of emotion or mood related variables that might
bring about these effects and influence time perception is large and
diverse [1]. So any implications of these findings are inevitably
speculative. Both attention and arousal have been suggested as key
mediating factors: with higher arousal and greater attention to
non-timing stimuli leading to shorter time estimates (a faster clock
for those who believe in clocks) e.g. [36,39]. Thus the high BDI
group could be more accurate: (a) because they are in a lower state
of arousal; (b) because they are paying more attention to internal
timing signals; (c) both (a) and (b); or (d) because debilitatingly high
levels of arousal are offset by meticulous attention to their internal
clock. In addition it should be noted that the effects of arousal may
depend on whether the arousal has negative or positive valence
[38]. Based on that study and our other work [3,8,38], we
speculate that both lower arousal and less attention to external
stimuli are mediating mechanisms.
Summary
Depressive realism is a phenomenon that has been characterised
as confined to a small number of specialised situations [55].
However, the results of this study show depressive realism to be
strongly evident in timing processes, which are a fundamental
aspect of all cognition. Detailed investigations of attention
mechanisms, beyond the scope of this report, may be needed to
account for the effect. Negative correlations between estimation
and production support a ticking clock as a necessary component
of human time judgment. The depressive realism effect shows that
additional mechanisms, voluntary or involuntary, are needed to
explain the full richness of human judgment for time, as for other
domains. The choice of the form of the psychophysical function
and the measure of accuracy has a profound effect on empirical
results and should always be addressed as key components of
analyses.
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